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NOTES
"WHAT TRANSFEREES OF PROPERTY ARE WITH-
IN THE PURVIEW OF THE BULK SALES
ACT OF MISSOURI"
In 1913 the Legislature of the State of Missouri passed an Act
regulating the sale, trade or disposition of certain stocks of merchan-
dise generally known as the "Bulk Sales Act." The act in general
has been copied from similar Acts in other States and the wording
of the Act is substantially similar to the Acts in other States, although
it is not identically the same in wording as the Act of any other
State.
Supply Company v. Smith, 182 Mo. App. 222 1. c.
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The Act is set forth in the Laws of Missouri, 1913, page 163. it
is a live question as to what transfers of property are within the
meaning of this Act. The Act provides that it shall apply to "the
sale, trade or other disposition of the major part in value or the whole
of a stock of merchandise, or merchandise, fixtures and equipment,
or equipment pertaining to the vendor's business, otherwise than in
the ordinary course of trade and in the regular prosecution in the
vendor business." Does the act apply to the sale of furniture of a
boarding house, or does it apply to the sale of the fixtures of a barber
shop, or does it apply to the transfer of all the office furniture of a
real estate agent? In other words, does the Missouri Act apply to
those bulk sales by persons engaged, not primarily in the sale of
merchandise, but to bulk sales by persons whose business is supplying
a service and whose business necessarily requires the ownership of
equipment and fixtures as an incident thereto? The question of what
property and what transfers are within the purview of the Act of Mis-
souri has not been di, ,ctly passed upon by any of the Missouri Courts
of Appeals or by the Supreme Court of Missouri, but inasmuch as
the Missouri Act is substantially similar in wording to the Acts of
other States, we can look to the expressions of those States for the
purpose of our statute.
Supply Co. v. Smith, 182 Mo. 222 1. c.
The purpose of the Missouri Act is stated in Supply Co. v. Smith,
supra, at, page 216, as follows:
"It is well to bear in mind that the bulk sales law is intended
to prevent a trader who is indebted from disposing of his mer-
chandise and fixtures in a manner other than the re.qular course
of trade which would enable him to place his property beyond
reach of his creditors."
It is the opinion of the writer that the Springfield Court of Ap-
peals meant by those words that the Act applies only to the dispo-
sion of goods by those whose business it is to sell merchandise; for
if that were not the Court's interpretation, the phrases "trader" and
"other than in the regular course of trade" would be meaningless. It
seems clear that the Act applies only to the disposition of goods by
persons whose business it is to sell merchandise, making void their
sales in bulk unless those sellers comply with the statutory restric-
tions. To one who is not engaged in the business of selling merchan-
dise, the Act has no application. "Vendor" in the Act means vendor
of a stock of merchandise.
An interesting case on this point is Heslop et al. v. Golden, de-
cided in 1915 by the Illinois Court of Appeals, and reported in 184
Ill. App. 388. The facts are that one Charles A. Straw rented desk
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space from defendant Golden in a suite of rooms at No. 19 South
LaSalle street, Chicago; the tenancy was by the month; and there
Straw conducted an employment agency. He had a desk, a chair,
a filing case, a rug and a few other articles of office furniture. He
sold nothing from said office, and had no connection with or semblance
to a mercantile establishment. Straw sold his furniture to the plain-
tiffs and left the building. Plaintiffs made a demand of the defend-
ant, Golden, for the furniture, but he claimed that he was a creditor
of Straw, that no valid title passed to plaintiff because Straw had
not complied with the provisions of the Bulk Sales Act before the
transfer, and refused to give up the furniture, whereupon plaintiff
brought a replevin suit.
The Court held that this property originally owned by Straw
did not come within the operation of the Bulk Sales Law. The Statute
of Illinois provides, in part, that
"The sale, transfer, or assignment in bulk of the major
part or the whole of a stock of merchandise and fixtures, or
other goods and chattels of the vendor's business * * * shall
be fraudulent and void as against creditors of the said vendor,
unless," etc.
It was claimed that the words "other goods and chattels of the
vendor's business" meant any and all fixtures, goods or chattels which
may be used in any trade or business. The Court did not give these
words, as used in the statute, so broad a meaning, but construed them
to mean "other goods and chattels" used in connection with the busi-
ness of selling merchandise, commodities or other wares. The court
held that office furniture of an employment agency is not so used and
is not affected by this statute and gave judgment for the plaintiff.
Following this decision the writer believes that the words of
the Missouri Act "merchandise, fixtures and equipment or equipment
pertaining to the vendor business" mean merchandise, fixtures and
equipment or equipment pertaining to vendor's business of selling
merchandise, commodities or other wares, and where the business of
the vendor is not the sale of merchandise, he is not affected by the
Act. In other words, if the business of the vendor is primarily to
render a service, and is not the sale of merchandise, the transfer of
his property in bulk is not within the Act, and the words of the statute,
"fixtures and equipment, or equipment pertaining to the vendor busi-
ness," do not apply to such a vendor. The Act applies only and
wholly to a vendor's stock of merchandise.
Numerous cases from other States sustain this view.
The Bulk Sales Act of Michigan provides that:
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"The sale, transfer, or assignment in bulk of any part or
the whole of a stock of merchandise, or merchandise and fixtures
pertaining to the conducting of said business, otherwise than
in ordinary course of trade, and in the regular and usual prose-
cution of the business of the seller, transferror or assignor
shall be void," etc.
The Supreme Court of Michigan construing this Act in Bowen v.
Quigley, 165 Mich. 337, held that the law did not apply to a transfer
of horses, wagons, harnesses, coal bags and other implements used
in the coal business, where no coal or other merchandise or fixtures
were included in the conveyance.
And so it was held that the act did not apply to the business of
an undertaker where vehicles, harness, caskets, and appliances used in
the business of an undertaker were sold, holding that such articles
and such a business did not come within the meaning of the statute.
People's Saving Bank v. Van Allebury, 165 Mich. 524.
Where an act makes sales, transfers, or assignments, in bulk "of
any part or the whole of a stock of merchandise and fixtures pertain-
ing to the conduct of said business otherwise than in the ordinary
course of trade and in the regular prosecution of the business of the
seller" void unless, etc., it does not apply to the furniture, fixtures,
and utensils used in the operation of a restaurant business without
proof that a merchandise business was conducted in connection with
or incidental to said restaurant business.
Johnson v. Kelley, (Sup. Ct. of N. D. 1915), 155 N. W. 683.
This North Dakota Court went on to say:
"The Act, we think applies only to sales of commodities
by persons who make it a business to buy commodities for
sale, and who, in the ordinary course of trade, sell them at
retail and in small quantities."
The Supreme Court of Utah, in 1916, in Swanson v. DeVine,
160 Pac. 872, held that thie business of a shoemaker did not come
within the statute. This Court quoted approvingly from Conn. Steam
Brown Stove Co. v. Lewis, 86 Conn. 386; 85 AtI. 534, 45 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 495, the following:
"And so, too, the extent to which retail sales are made
by one, in connection with another business should be con-
sidered in deciding whether the person making such retail
sales can be fairly said to be one 'who makes it his business'
to sell commodities in small quantities for the purpose of mak-
ing a profit. One who purchases metals and wood with which
to manufacture and sell sewing machines at retail can hardly
be said to make it his business to buy such original materials
and sell 'the same' for the purpose of making a profit upon the
commodities which he has bought, nor can a wholesale dealer
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or manufacturer, because he has occasionally made a sale of
goods at retail properly be said to 'make it his business' to sell
commodities in small quantities for the purpose of making a
profit upon the goods thus sold."
These latter two cases hold that the Act does not apply to any
pursuit, occupation or business unless its main purpose is to dispose
of merchandise by the means of selling at retail.
The Supreme Court of Georgia, in Cooney, Eckstein & Company
v, Sweat et at, 133 Ga. 511, in holding that an act regulating the sale
of goods, wares, and merchandise in bulk, has no application to a
sale of substantially all the lumber manufactured by one who operates
a sawmill at which trees are manufactured into lumber, states:
"The object of the legislature in passing the statute was
the protection of persons who had extended credit to merchants
on the faith of apparent prosperity indicated by a stock of
goods, wares, and merchandise, which would not be sold in bulk
to one person, but which would be sold out gradually, and
replenished from time to time. When merchants sell their
entire stock of goods to one person without notice of any kind
to their creditors, a fraud is frequently perpetrated upon the
creditors; and it was the intention of the legislature to afford
a remedy to the victims of these fraudulent sales. The Act
is in derogation of the common law, and of a person's right
to alienate his property without restriction, and is, therefore,
strictly construed. * * * * *
"In the construction of statutes of this kind it is always
well to consider the evil intended to be reached. 'That evil,'
says Vann, J., in his dissenting opinion, in the case of Wright
v. Hart, 182 N. Y. 330, 2 L. R. A. (N.S.) 338, 'is the tendency
and practice of merchants who are heavily in debt to make
secret sales of their merchandise in bulk for the purpose of
defrauding creditors. Common observation shows that when
a dealer has reached a point in his business career where he
cannot go on, owing to the claims of creditors, the temptation
is strong and the practice common of making fraudulent sales.'
The Act of 1903 (referring to the Bulk Sales Act of Georgia)
bears internal evidence of a legislative intent to confine its
operation to merchandise or dealers in merchandise.
"The word 'merchandise' is, however, not to be taken in
such a restricted sense as to exclude the usual and customary
accessories of a mercantile or trading establishment when a sales
in bulk is made of the whole. Thus, bar fixtures, safes, desks,
cash registers, cigar cases, pool tables, refrigerators and the
like, used in connection with a business to which they are ap-
propriate, in facilitating the operation of such business, and the
sale of goods connected therewith have been held to be included
in the sale of the business, within the meaning of the Bulk Sales
Act."
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW.
In Everett Produce Co. v. Smith, 40 Wash. 566, 82 Pac. 905, 2
L. P, A. (N. S.) 33, it was held that a sale of the horses, wagons,
and harness, comprising the stock in the livery stable of an under-
taking company was not a sale of a stock of goods, wares, or mer-
chandise within the meaning of the Statute, holding that the Statute
only applied to a vendor of merchandise and that the business of the
undertaking company is not within the purview of the Act.
In an action by a trustee in bankruptcy to recover certain property
transferred, claiming that the transfer was void because in violation
of the Bulk Sales Law, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court
of New York held that the Act did not apply to a transfer by a hotel
keeper of furniture and fixtures of a hotel.
Steward v. Siegler, Sup. Ct. (App. Div.) N. Y., Nov. 1916, 161
N. Y. S. 489.
Though the particular point in question has not been decided by
our Missouri courts, the point of view assumed in this article seems
to have been taken inferentially by the Kansas City Court of Appeals
in Riley Pennsylvania Oil Company v. Symonds, 190 S. W., 1038, 1. c.,
1040, where that Court states:
"It seems to us that the meaning of the statute (referring
to the Missouri Act), is that a vendor who buys and obtains
possession of merchandise in bulk, without ascertaining the
vendor's creditors and notifying them as required by the stat-
ute," etc.
The.Illinois Act is more inclusive than our Missouri Act and the
matter in hand has been passed upon in that State several times.
In Richardson Coal Co. v. Cermak et al., 109 Ill. App. 106, de-
cided December, 1914, a replevin suit, the only question presented on
the record was one of law, whether what is known as the Bulk Sales
Law of 1913 (Hurds R. S., 1913, p. 906), applied to a sale of a double
team of horses, including harness and wagon, which the vendor had
been personally using to haul coal for others at a compensation of so
much per ton.
The act, as heretofore recited, renders fraudulent and void as
against creditors of the vendor, unless the vendee complies with cer-
tain conditions therein named, "the sale, transfer, or assignment in
bulk of the major parts or the whole of a stock of nerchandise, or
merchandise and fixtures or other goods and chattels of the vendor's
business, otherwise than in the ordinary course of trade and in the
regular and usual prosecution of the vendor's business."
The Court held that this was construed in Johnson Co. v. Beloosky,
263 111. 363, as prohibiting the sale of any goods and chattels in bull
otherwise than in the ordinary course of trade in the regular prosecu-
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tion of trade in the regular prosecution of business, and the Court
specifically held that the Bulk Sales Act
"'must be presumed, we think, to relate to a business or trade
where, in the ordinary course and regular prosecution thereof,
the qoods or chattels, whatever they might consist of, are not
ordinarily and regularly sold by the owner in bulk." "But here,"
the Court went on to state, "the vendor was working for wages.
* * * Manifestly the act did not contemplate that one
called on to render personal services cannot sell the chattels,
goods, or things that are appurtenant thereto unless the con-
ditions imposed by said Act are complied with. Otherwise, a
lawyer could not sell his library, a surgeon his instruments, a
broker his office furniture, or a carpenter his tools without
compliance with such conditions. If such were the proper in-
terpretation of the Act, we could hardly imagine a more bur-
densome restriction upon one's property rights."
The same principle is maintained in a Montana case recently de-
cided, which carefully reviews the authorities.
In Ferrat v. Adamson, 163 Pac. 112, decided by the Supreme
Court of Montana, January 22, 1917, the facts are that in March,
1914, one Madden owned a pool hall business in the conduct of which
he employed certain pool tables, cues, and balls, and also kept for
,,ale small quantities of tobacco, cigars, etc. He sold the entire property
in one transaction to one Ferrat without attempting to comply with
the Bulk Sales Law of Montana. Leo Spring, a creditor of Madden,
reduced his claim to judgment, secured an execution and placed it
in the hands of a constable. Assuming to act under the execution,
Adamson seized and sold the pool tables, cues, and balls as the prop-
erty of Madden. Ferrat thereupon commenced this action to recover;
the cause was tried, resulting in a judgment for plaintiff from which
defendants appeal.
The question most important for our purposes on appeal was
"Did the pool tables, cues, and balls used in conducting the pool hall
business constitute a stock, or a part of a stock of goods, wares, or
merchandise, the sale of which is regulated by the Bulk Sales Law
(R. C. Mont. 6131-6135) ?'
The title of the Act is:
"An Act regulating the sale of merchandise in bulk and making
provision for the protection of the creditors of the vendor." Laws
1907, p. 373.
The Court stated that "nearly every State in the Union had
adopted a like statute designed to accomplish the same end; that the
scope of these acts had been considered in many cases, and the Court
decided that the weight of authority and better reasoning justify the
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conclusion that it was the legislative purpose to regulate the sale in
bulk of such articles only as the merchant keeps for sale in the ordi-
nary course of his business," citing numerous authorities, many of
which have been cited herein.
The Montana Court then specifically held that the pool tables,
cues, and balls were kept for use, but not for sale, and the transaction
between Madden and Ferrat did not fall within the purview of the
Bulk Sales Act.
Following the great weight of authority, it seems to me it was
the purpose of the Missouri Act to regulate the sales in bulk of
such articles only as a merchant keeps for sale in the ordinary course
of his business, and that the Act does not apply to the sale or transfer
of any of the fixtures or equipment of a business, unless the primary
purpose of that business is to sell merchandise. I do not believe that
it applies to a manufacturing business or to a hotel business; or to
a professional business, such as doctor or a lawyer; or to the busi-
ness of an artisan. To repeat, I believe that the Act applies only to
vendors of merchandise, and by merchandise is meant such articles
only as a merchant keeps for sale in the ordinary course of his business.
A. J. F.
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